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Abstract
THE VALUE AND VALUATION OF KNOWLEDGE COMPONENTS IN
DECISION MAKING FOR CHOICE
Past literature has typically conceptualized expertise as an all-
or-none proposition, in which consumers have been classified as either
experts or novices. This paper conceptualizes expertise in consumer
choice as a multi-stage process. Two knowledge components, product
familiarity and knowledge of choice strategies, are identified to
classify consumers into four different stages of expertise. Consumer
choice behavior in terms of objective and perceived choice quality are
examined in these four stages. Results suggest that strategy knowledge
is more useful than product familiarity for making good quality choices.
However, product familiarity is valued more by consumers while assessing
their choice performance.

Consumer choice is an important element of consumer decision
making. In many instances, consumer choice involves the purchase of
items that have been purchased before. In a repetitive choice
situation, consumers try to simplify their choice processes by utilizing
choice strategies that have proven successful in previous choice
situations. Howard and Sheth (1968) call this behavior the "psychology
of simplification." According to Howard and Sheth, consumers progress
from an "extensive problem solving" stage through a "limited problem
solving" stage to a "routinized response" stage as they make more and
more choices in a product category. This progression implies that
consumers acquire some kind of knowledge that helps them simplify their
choice process.
Consumer knowledge and its acquisition has received much attention
in the past literature (see Alba and Hutchinson (1987) for a review).
The general approach in past studies has been to classify consumers into
two distinct categories - experts and novices (see for example, Beattie
1983; Sujan 1985). The assumption has been that experts have access to
a larger knowledge base than novices. Therefore, in the repetitive
choice situation discussed above, acquisition of a knowledge base
enables consumers to progress from novices to experts, which in turn
allows them to move from an extensive problem solving stage to a more
routinized response stage.
Howard and Sheth ' s conceptualization of a 'limited problem
solving' stage suggests that consumers pass through intermediate stages
as they become experts. Previous research on the acquisition of
expertise has paid less attention to how consumers behave in these
intermediate stages, and has tended to focus more on ascertaining the
differences in consumer behavior between the initial and the final
stage.
This research focuses on the intermediate stages. Specifically,
it deals with the issue of characterizing the nature of consumer
2knowledge in these intermediate stages. In, doing so, it identifies two
components of consumer knowledge that are useful in classifying
consumers into different stages. Further, the research also studies how
each component of knowledge influences consumers' choice and perceptions
of choice quality.
To address the above issues, this research builds upon past
research in consumer behavior and psychology on expertise in choice
making and problem solving. In the following sections of this paper, a
theory-based rationale is presented for examining two components of
expertise that are relevant for making a choice: familiarity with the
product category, and knowledge of a choice strategy for integrating and
evaluating information about brands. Empirical assessments of the
effects of these two components on objective and perceived quality of
consumer choice are obtained with two studies. These studies are
described, their results are presented and their implications for
consumer behavior are discussed.
BACKGROUND
In their model of consumer knowledge, Alba and Hutchinson (1987)
distinguish between two types of knowledge: familiarity and expertise.
They define familiarity as "the number of product-related experiences
that have been accumulated by the consumer." Expertise, which includes
familiarity, is defined as "the ability to perform product-related tasks
successfully" (Alba and Hutchinson (1987) p. 411). According to Alba
and Hutchinson, expertise is comprised of both product information and
the procedural skills necessary to utilize the product information.
Moreover, increased familiarity with a particular product category has a
direct impact upon the ability to utilize the information; in short,
familiarity with the product and the ability to make successful choices
are intertwined.
The view of expertise as, at least in part, a function of
familiarity with the product category has received support from several
3studies. In fact, much of the literature has focused upon the effects
of knowledge of product-specific information, such as knowledge about
relevant attributes and the values typically associated with them, on
choice. While some studies in this area have looked at the effects of
product knowledge on information search (Bettman and Park 1980; Brucks
1985; Srull 1983), others have examined the effects of product knowledge
on the evaluation processes (Sujan 1985).
These above studies have shown important effects of product
knowledge on consumer behavior. For example, Sujan (1985) considered
the impact of familiarity with product information not only on consumer
choices, but also on the choice strategies used by expert and novice
consumers. She demonstrated that consumers with more familiarity with a
product category exhibited bigger differences than novices in the types
of strategies, category-based or piecemeal, that they used when faced
with information that either matched or mismatched the stored
information.
Beattie's (1983) model proposed that experts, with their complex
knowledge structures, would judge a brand's similarity to an ideal brand
differently than would novices. According to Beattie, experts would
processes differences as well as similarities on each attribute between
the presented brand and a perceived ideal. Novices, however, would
process only similarities. The differences in processing were proposed
to account for differences in choices made by experts and novices.
The research by Sujan and Beattie is indicative of a general view
that it is the information and its structure in long-term memory that is
the determinant of consumer expertise (Bettman 1986). However, although
product familiarity is undoubtedly useful in the development of choice
skill, it is not necessarily the sole contributor to the development of
such skill. For example, consumers may abstract general choice
strategies which can be transferred from one product category to
another. To understand this, consider a choice situation. There are
4typically two tasks associated with a choice situation. One task is the
extraction of relevant information about products from the environment.
The other task is the application of a particular choice strategy to the
product information, and the selection of the product that offers the
highest utility to the consumer. These two tasks need not be
sequential. In some situations, consumers may select a choice strategy
before acquiring the product information, using the strategy as a
template for guiding information acquisition (Bettman and Kakkar 1977;
Lussier and Olshavsky 1979). In other situations, consumers may acquire
the product information before selecting an evaluative strategy (Biehal
and Chakravarti 1982). Sometimes the two tasks may occur
simultaneously, as when consumers construct strategies at the time of
information evaluation (Bettman and Zins 1977).
The implications of task separation for developing consumer
expertise are important. For example, in some situations consumers are
passively exposed to product information without a goal for encoding
information (e.g., exposure to advertisements). Some of the information
may be unintentionally encoded in long term memory (Gordon and Holyoak
1983). Consequently, over a period of time consumers can become
familiar with the products in a particular category without necessarily
becoming experts in utilizing the information effectively to make good
quality choices. Alternatively, consumers may develop a choice strategy
while making a choice in one product category that can be transferred
while making a choice in another category. Thus, consumers can have
familiarity without having the procedural skill of a choice strategy, or
vice versa.
That strategies for making choices can be developed and used
independently of product-specific information is supported by research
on problem-solving abilities in psychology. Anzai and Simon (1979)
develop a theory of "learning by doing," in which they argue that people
learn which strategies are most appropriate for problem solving in a
5particular domain by a process of trial and error. Anzai and Simon draw
a clear distinction between prior knowledge (such as familiarity with
the problem representation) and the processes used to solve the problem
(described as the general learning capabilities of their model). This
would imply that one can learn a strategy in one domain, and then retain
knowledge of that strategy for use in a different domain. Anzai and
Simon refer to this type of strategy as one that is "task independent."
This depiction is consistent with earlier work by Newell and Simon
(1972), who describe two main elements of problems and their solution:
the representation of information and the method used to process it.
The method can be specified independently of task information.
Chi, Glaser and Rees (1981) also describe expertise as consisting
of two components: a body of usable information and procedural skill.
They suggest that what distinguishes experts from novices in any domain
is that experts have the ability to convert knowledge of fundamental
principles (as in physics problems) into procedures for problem solving.
That is, a large amount of product specific information does not
automatically make someone an expert. Information may be useless unless
the consumer knows how to utilize it.
In summary, past research on expertise and consumer knowledge
suggests two key items for examination: 1) that expertise may consist of
at least two different components, i.e., product familiarity and
knowledge of choice strategies, and 2) that expertise is not an all-or-
none proposition; it may exist in stages. The first aspect is related
to the second, in that a consumer who possesses one of the two
components is likely to be more of an expert than a consumer who
possesses neither. Further, the two components are independent in that
a consumer can possess one in the absence of the other.
This view of consumer knowledge is represented in Figure 1.
Consumers who have botlj familiarity with the product category and know
an appropriate choice strategy can be classified as Experts. Consumers
who have neither product familiarity nor knowledge of choice strategies
can be classified as Novices. Consumers who have product familiarity
but not knowledge of choice strategies can be classified as "Amateurs."
Consumers with knowledge of choice strategies but not product
familiarity can be classified as "Theorists." 1 This framework extends
previous research, in which consumers have typically been classified
into one of two categories: experts or novices. We propose that the
inclusion of two intermediate stages between those of novice and expert
captures a broader range of expertise. In this approach, expertise is a
conceptualized as a multi-stage process involving different knowledge
components, rather than as a simple all-or-none proposition.
PRODUCT FAMILIARITY
No Yes
Novices Amateurs
Theorists Experts
KNOWLEDGE No
OF CHOICE
STRATEGIES
Yes
Figure 1
There are two key aspects of knowledge acquisition that are worthy
of attention. One is the existence of knowledge in consumers and the
other is the recognition of the existence of this knowledge by
consumers. En route to becoming experts, consumers not only develop a
knowledge base, but they also become aware of this growing knowledge
base, which makes them more confident of their decisions. Part of
becoming an expert is this growing awareness of improved ability and
familiarity.
'The authors thank Professor John Carroll of MIT for suggesting the
terminology "Amateurs" and "Theorists."
7While the existence of a knowledge base would, no doubt, manifest
itself in superior choices, it is the awareness of the knowledge that
would result in confidence in the quality of the choice. Thus, there
are really two key issues - the objective choice quality and the
consumers' perceived choice quality. Both issues are examined in this
research.
The key contribution of this paper lies in the identification and
exploration of these intermediate stages. It is important to note that
consumers need not necessarily progress through these four stages
sequentially. Some consumers may start out as Novices, become Amateurs
and then become Experts. Others may become Theorists before becoming
Experts. While the 'route to expertise' is, no doubt, an important
topic of enquiry, the questions tackled in this study relate more to the
systematic differences between consumers who are in the different
stages. The differences, if any, are explored with particular reference
to consumers' objective choice quality as well their perceived choice
quality.
HYPOTHESES
In this section, hypotheses about the influence of product
familiarity and knowledge of choice strategy, both singly and together,
are developed in terms of objective and perceived choice quality.
Objective choice quality is an objective measure of how good the chosen
brand is, compared with other brands. Perceived choice quality refers
to the consumers* perceptions about the quality of their choice.
Objective Choice Quality
Psychology research in expertise suggests that experts have
greater access to stronger methods (i.e., procedures or strategies) for
solving problems than novices, who rely on weaker methods (Langley,
Simon, Bradshaw and Zytgow 1987; Sweller, Mawer and Ward 1983). For
example, in physics problem-solving, these stronger methods make use of
8axioms or fundamental principles to solve problems (Chi, et al. 1981;
Larkin, et al. 1980). Novices use weaker methods, such as relying on
superficial aspects of the problem, to guide solution attempts. These
weaker methods often lead to incorrect solutions. Extending the idea of
weak and strong methods to a consumer choice setting, it can be argued
that a consumer who has knowledge of an appropriate strategy (a strong
method) for integrating and evaluating product information will tend to
make better brand choices than a consumer without such strategy
knowledge. In the classification presented in Figure 1, Theorists and
Experts have knowledge of choice strategies whereas Amateurs and Novices
do not. Therefore, despite product familiarity, Amateurs, who do not
have knowledge of choice strategies, will have to construct an
appropriate strategy, unlike Theorists or Experts, who simply have to
retrieve an appropriate choice strategy. Therefore, we expect that
Theorists and Experts will exhibit superior objective choice performance
compared to Novices or Amateurs.
It should be noted, however, that work on implicit learning (e.g.,
Gordon and Holyoak 1983) indicates that people do internalize
information about patterns and structure of information while passively
attending to information, and that they may use this information to
abstract strategies for later use. Therefore, it is possible that
Amateurs, while attending to product information, may unconsciously
abstract choice strategies. Thus, Amateurs may have an advantage over
Novices in their ability to organize information. More formally, we
hypothesize,
Hypothesis 1: The objective choice quality will follow the
sequence: Experts > Theorists > Amateurs >
Novices
.
This hypothesis essentially states that Experts will perform the best,
followed by Theorists, then by Amateurs, and finally by Novices.
9Perceived Choice Quality
As noted earlier, consumers' perceived choice quality may depend
on the degree of their perceived self-expertise. In general, the
greater the degree of perceived self-expertise, the higher the estimate
of perceived choice quality. In other words, consumers who consider
themselves more expert will tend to rate their performance more highly
than those who consider themselves less expert (Arkes, Dawes and
Christensen 1986).
Consumers can assess the degree of their self-expertise by looking
at either external or internal indicators of expertise. The external
indicators might be task-oriented, such as the quality of the choice or
the method used in making the choice. Internal indicators might be
person-oriented, such as the recognition that one possesses procedural
skills for performing a task. In general, external indicators would be
useful where the correctness or incorrectness of the outcome or process
is unambiguous, as in situations where feedback is immediately
available. In most consumer situations, however, outcome feedback may
not so easily available. In these situations, consumers may have to
rely either on internal indicators, such as the recognition that they
possess choice skills, or on process feedback, such as the effort
expended in making the choice.
There is some evidence that the internal indicators may be
difficult to assess. Studies have shown that people who internalize
procedural knowledge through practice at a task may not be aware or able
to articulate that they possess such knowledge (Lewicki 1986; Lewicki,
Hill and Bizot 1988). Procedural knowledge, such as choice strategy
knowledge, is usually encoded at a deeper level than product familiarity
and may not be easily recognized. In contrast, people are more likely
to be aware that they possess product familiarity, as this awareness may
be more accessible than awareness of knowledge of choice strategies.
Therefore, Amateurs, who have product familiarity, are expected to see
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themselves as being more expert than Theorists. Because perceived self-
expertise may influence perceptions of performance, we hypothesize,
Hypothesis 2: The perceived choice quality will follow the
sequence: Experts > Amateurs > Theorists >
Novices.
Note that the sequences in Hypotheses 1 and 2 are different. In
both cases, Experts are expected to have the highest choice quality and
Novices the lowest. The interesting difference lies in the predictions
about Amateurs and Theorists. Theorists are expected to perform
objectively better than Amateurs, but Amateurs are expected to perceive
their performance to be higher than that by Theorists.
To summarize the expectations about performance, we believe that
subjects with strategy knowledge, i.e., Theorists and Experts, will
outperform subjects without strategy knowledge, i.e., Amateurs and
Novices. However, in terms of how subjects believe they perform, we
expect that subjects with familiarity will overestimate their
performance, placing greater value on familiarity than is warranted by
objective performance (i.e., choice quality). In addition, when only
one of the two components of expertise is present, we expect that
strategy knowledge will prove more valuable than familiarity for
objective choice quality, that is, Theorists will outperform Amateurs.
At the same time, we expect that perceived estimates will be reversed;
Amateurs will perceive their performance more highly than Theorists.
Performance Estimation Error Index
In addition to actual and perceived performance, a performance
estimation error index can be developed to reflect the mismatch between
objective and perceived choice quality. This measure is constructed by
subtracting objective choice quality from perceived choice quality
(Arkes, Dawes, et al. 1986). The performance estimation error index is
a measure of consumer overconf idence. A index value greater than zero
implies overconf idence in performance, whereas an index value less than
zero implies underconf idence. Following the general arguments outlined
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earlier, we expect Amateurs to overestimate and Theorists to
underestimate the quality of their choice.
Hypothesis 3: The performance estimation error, as measured by
the difference between the perceived and objective
performance, will follow the form: Amateurs >
Theorists. While for Amateurs, perceived choice
quality will be greater than objective choice
quality, for Theorists, the pattern will be
reversed.
We do not make any formal predictions about the behavior of
Experts and Novices; however, we will examine their responses to see how
they compare with observed behaviors of subjects in the other
categories. We expect to find that Experts, who presumably have the
greatest awareness of the knowledge they possess, should be most
accurate at predicting their performance.
METHOD
The hypotheses were tested in two studies. In both studies,
subjects were undergraduates at a major midwestern university. All
subjects received extra course credit for participating in the studies.
Fifty-one subjects participated in the first study and ninety-seven
participated in the second study.
Experiment One
Design. In the first study, two independent variables were manipulated
between-subjects: 1) product familiarity, and 2) knowledge of a choice
strategy. The study consisted of a training phase with five training
choice or judgment problems and a test phase with one choice problem.
The training phase was designed to enable subjects to acquire product
familiarity and/or knowledge of choice strategies. Problems consisted
of four brands, each described by the same four attributes, and were
displayed as brand/attribute matrices. There were four treatment
conditions, each corresponding to a cell of the matrix in Figure 1.
Independent variables. To manipulate product familiarity, one-half of
the subjects were trained in the same category, laptop computers, for
both the training and the test phase. The remaining subjects were
12
trained in one product category, microwave ovens, and then shown a
completely different product category, laptop computers, for the test
phase. The rationale behind this manipulation is that the subjects who
have multiple exposures to the product category will develop familiarity
with the relevant attributes and their values, both in terms of ranges
and typicality (Coupey and Nakamoto 1988)
.
The manipulation of strategy knowledge was accomplished through a
goal manipulation. One-half of the subjects were asked to examine
information in the brand sets in the training phase with a goal of
choosing the best overall brand in each set. The remaining subjects
were asked to complete a judgment task in the training phase. These
subjects compared pairs of brands to assess similarity. In the test
phase, all subjects were directed to choose the best overall brand.
Figure 2 is a schematic representation of the task. The assumption
underlying the manipulation of strategy knowledge was that subjects who
have multiple opportunities to achieve a specific goal will abstract a
procedure, or choice strategy, appropriate for reaching the goal (Anzai
and Simon 1979). It was expected that subjects given the judgment task
in the training phase would have less knowledge of an appropriate choice
strategy for the final test problem. Therefore, the objective choice
quality of these subjects, relative to that of subjects who had
practiced making choices in the test phase, was expected to be inferior.
Figure 2 about here
Regardless of the condition, all problems were constructed to be
comparable in the number of brands and attributes. Each problem had
four brands and four attributes. For microwave ovens, the attributes
used were interior capacity, number of power levels, wattage, and length
of warranty. For laptop computers, the attributes used were weight,
number of programs, internal memory, and external memory.
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Dependent measures. Two primary dependent measures were obtained: a
measure of objective choice quality and a measure of perceived choice
quality. The measure of objective choice quality was the rank of the
subject's selected brand from the four brands in the final test problem.
The brands were ranked from the best to the worst using a weighted-
adding rule. The weights for the attributes were obtained from each
subject at the end of the test phase. The index was computed by
multiplying the subject's weights with the levels of the attribute, for
all attributes of a brand. These products were then summed across each
brand to obtain the total brand value. The brand with the highest index
value was ranked 1, and the brand with the lowest value was ranked 4.
Therefore, a lower index value indicated a superior performance level.
The perceived choice quality was simply the subject's own estimate
of the rank for his or her chosen brand. Subjects were asked to check
the statement that they felt reflected their choice quality: "I chose
the best brand," "I chose the second best brand," etc. Again, a lower
value indicated a superior assessment of performance.
In addition to the objective and perceived choice quality, two
other dependent measures were obtained on nine-point scale ratings. One
of the measures related to outcome performance was subjects' confidence
with the final choice. The other measure related to process performance
was subjects' satisfaction with the process used to make the choice.
Results.
Objective Choice Quality (Hypothesis 1) . The results showed that the
objective measure of choice quality was directionally consistent with
hypothesis 1. Novices did worst, with a mean rank of 2.42 (range of
l(best) to 4 (worst)), while Amateurs did slightly better with a mean
rank of 2.31. Theorists (mean=1.7) were better than Amateurs, but
marginally worse than Experts (mean=1.69). A two-way analysis of
variance with strategy knowledge and product knowledge as factors
revealed a significant main effect of strategy knowledge (F (1 50) = 6.64;
14
p<0.01). Subjects who made choice decisions in the training phase
outperformed subjects who made judgment decisions in the training phase
(means ranks of 1.7 and 2.36 respectively). There was no significant
effect of product familiarity (F
(1 5Q)
= 0.04; p<0.83), or for the
strategy knowledge and product familiarity interaction (F (1 50) = 0.03;
p<0.85). However, because there was an a priori theoretical basis for
expecting that the cell means would differ in a predicted pattern
(Winer, 1971, p. 384), a statistical contrast of the means for Amateurs
and Theorists was performed. The contrast was significant (t
( 5Q)
= 1*66;
p<0.01), suggesting that prior knowledge of a strategy for making a
choice may be more helpful in making good quality choices than prior
knowledge about product features. This supported the premise that it is
essentially strategy knowledge that results in superior performance.
Perceived Choice Quality (Hypothesis 2) . The results for the perceived
choice quality show that the pattern is the reverse of that found for
objective choice quality; highest estimates of performance were given by
Novices (mean=1.25). Amateurs were next (mean=1.56), followed by
Theorists (mean=1.6). Experts gave the lowest estimates (mean=2.00).
A two-way analysis of variance with strategy knowledge and product
familiarity as the factors revealed a significant effect of strategy
knowledge (F (1 5Q) = 4.86; p<0.03); subjects with strategy knowledge
(mean=1.83) perceived their performance more negatively than those with
no strategy knowledge (mean=1.43). There was also a significant main
effect of product familiarity (F,. 5Q . = 4.0; p<0.05); subjects with
product knowledge assessed their performance more negatively (mean=1.76)
than those without product knowledge (mean=1.41). The interaction
between strategy knowledge and product familiarity was not significant
(F,,|
50)
= 0„06; p<0.81). The contrast between the means for Amateurs
and Theorists was also not significant.
Performance Estimation Error (Hypothesis 3) . An index of performance
estimation error was estimated by subtracting perceived choice quality
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ranks from objective choice quality ranks'. Recall that in this index,
values greater than zero indicate overconf idence, and values less than
zero indicate underconf idence. From the index it appears that Novices
were most overconfident (mean=1.17), while Experts were actually
underconf ident (mean=-0. 31) . As hypothesized, Amateurs (mean=0.75) were
more overconfident than Theorists (mean=0.1). Theorists were closest to
predicting their performance levels accurately.
A two-way analysis of variance with strategy and product knowledge
as the between-subject factors revealed a significant main effect of
strategy knowledge (F (1 5Q . = 13.06; p<0.0007). The mean performance
estimation error index for subjects without strategy knowledge was 0.93,
compared with -0.13 for subjects with strategy knowledge. There was no
significant effect of product knowledge (F
(1 5Q) = 1.97, p<0.16).
The interaction effect of strategy knowledge and product knowledge
was not significant (F
(1 5Q)
= 0.0002; p<0.99). Thus, while the results
provided directional support for Hypothesis 3, they were not
statistically significant. The contrast between the means of Amateurs
and Theorists, tested despite the non-significant overall F-value, was
only marginally significant (t (5Q) = 1.55; p<0.12).
The objective and perceived choice quality as well as the
performance estimation errors for Study 1 are summarized by cells in
Figure 3.
Figure 3 about here
Subjects' Satisfaction and Confidence Ratings
Analysis of the process-related ratings of satisfaction with the
procedure obtained on nine-point rating scales revealed a marginally
2Note that this measure is actually the negative of the
overconf idence measure defined by Arkes et al. This was done to account
for the fact that the performance indices in this study were ranks,
where a higher value indicated a lower level of performance. By taking
the negative of the Arkes et al. definition, we ensured that a higher
performance estimation error reflected more overconf idence.
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significant main effect of strategy knowledge (F (1 5Q) = 2.74; p<0.10);
subjects with strategy knowledge were less satisfied (mean=5.02) than
subjects without strategy knowledge (mean=5.75). However, there was no
difference in satisfaction with the process between subjects in the
familiarity and no familiarity conditions (F (1 50) = 2.0; p<0.17). The
interaction of product familiarity and strategy knowledge was also not
significant (F (1 50) = 2.18; p<0.14).
The outcome-related ratings on confidence with the choice showed
no significant differences for strategy knowledge (F (1 5Q) = 2.35;
p<0.13), product familiarity (F (1 50) = 0.08; p<0.77), or their
interaction (F (1 50) = 0.23; p<0.63).
Discussion.
These results support the proposition that subjects possess two
distinct types of knowledge, product familiarity and knowledge of choice
strategies. Procedural knowledge, or being able to use a known choice
strategy, appears to be more useful in making good choices than product
familiarity. Subjects with product knowledge have a small advantage
over subjects who have neither strategy nor product knowledge.
Moreover, having strategy knowledge, even in the absence of product
familiarity, is still more beneficial than just having only product
familiarity.
At least two different rationales, one theoretical and the other
procedural, may explain this finding. First, subjects with strategy
knowledge may have used information more consistently than subjects
without strategy knowledge. This may have led to more compensatory
processing of attribute values, thereby resulting in better objective
choice quality. Subjects without strategy knowledge may not have been
able to use, or even to construct, a compensatory strategy very well.
In essence, this rationale assumes that subjects with only product
familiarity, i.e., Amateurs and Novices, either chose randomly, without
a strategy, or that they attempted to construct strategies on-the-spot.
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If the latter assumption is true, then the constructed strategies were
not as optimal for making choices as the strategies abstracted
previously from multiple choice episodes. This was the rationale which
resulted in hypothesis 1. An alternative explanation can also be
constructed as described below.
The second possible rationale for why Theorists outperformed
Amateurs may lie in the experiment procedure. All of the stimuli were
presented as brand/attribute matrices. This format may have facilitated
the use of a compensatory strategy that promoted better choices more
than it helped subjects learn and organize product information. One
benefit of product knowledge in developing expertise is that it may help
the consumer to structure information (Beattie 1983), in effect, to
construct a useful representation of information. One limitation of
this study was that the manipulation of product knowledge did not enable
examination of this facet of expertise.
In general, the differences between objective performance in the
four cells were small. Although the cell means follow the predicted
pattern for objective performance, we cannot unequivocally state that
the observed differences are systematic and would not change with
changes to the manipulations or the inclusion of additional controls.
For example, Novices and Amateurs might have developed a choice strategy
during the final test phase. Because no time limit was imposed during
the test phase, subjects may have tried different methods for evaluating
brands, perhaps using process feedback, such as effort (Creyer, Bettman,
and Payne 1989), as a guide, until an acceptable strategy was developed.
Thus, having unlimited time to try out strategies may have enabled
Amateurs and Novices to acquire some of the procedural skills presumed
to be available only to Theorists and Experts. This may explain why
observed differences between the cells were small.
The ratings on perceptions of performance, i.e., confidence and
satisfaction, showed that subjects who had strategy knowledge were less
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satisfied with the process used to make the choice than those who did
not have strategy knowledge. However, the differences between the
strategy and no-strategy groups were not significant as far as the
confidence with the outcome was concerned. Further, there were no
differences in both satisfaction with the process and confidence in the
outcome between the product familiarity and no-familiarity conditions.
These findings are important because they point to differences in the
way subjects assessed the process and the outcome. As noted earlier,
subjects might use external or internal indicators to evaluate their
performance. Because no outcome feedback, such as choice quality, was
given, subjects had no external indicators of outcome performance. In
addition, there were probably no internal indicators of outcome
performance for the subjects. This may explain the finding that there
was no difference on confidence between the strategy and no-strategy
conditions. However, in the case of satisfaction with the process,
while there were no external indicators in the form of feedback,
subjects may have found it easier to rely on internal indicators.
Subjects with the strategy knowledge may not have recognized that they
had a useful strategy gained through repeated exposures. Work on
implicit learning (e.g.., Reber 1976) suggests that knowledge—as of a
strategy—and ability to use that knowledge, may often precede awareness
of the knowledge and the ability to verbalize it. It is interesting to
note that subjects with no strategy knowledge were significantly more
satisfied than those with strategy knowledge. This finding warrants
further investigation.
A second study was designed to examine the role of awareness on
perceived choice quality, and to address the limitations discussed
earlier. To this end, changes were made to the manipulations of
familiarity and strategy knowledge, the format of the stimuli, and the
procedure used to collect the data.
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Experiment Two
Design. As in the first study, the independent variables of product
familiarity and strategy knowledge were manipulated, resulting again in
four treatment conditions. However, in order to address the limitations
of the first study described above, and to assess the impact of
awareness of a knowledge component on choice behavior, both
manipulations were altered as described below.
Independent variables. The familiarity manipulation was changed
primarily in two ways. First, unlike the previous study, subjects did
not develop product familiarity through prior repeated exposure to
brands in the product category. Second, the brand/attribute training
format was discarded. Instead, to provide a more stringent assessment
of the benefits of strategy and product familiarity, a new test format
was designed to examine how familiarity aids consumers in organizing
information for making a choice. Subjects in the familiarity condition
received a one page description of the product category, laptop
computers. Without referring to specific brands, the page detailed
which attributes were relevant for making good choices, and the usual
ranges and most typical values of these attributes. Six attributes were
used: memory, battery life, weight, disk speed, screen quality, and
whether the laptop had a monitor port. Information about which
attributes were not diagnostic was also provided. For example,
statements such as, "Weight of the laptop computer is also important,
but because all laptops tend to weigh pretty much the same amount, this
information is not helpful in making a good choice," were included.
Subjects in the no-familiarity condition were given a page of
information of the same length and complexity, but for microwave ovens.
In both conditions, the test phase required subjects to make a choice
among laptop computers.
The second change to the familiarity manipulation occurred in the
presentation of the test stimulus. Rather than presenting brands in
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matrix form, the information was presented in paragraph form, one
paragraph per brand. This presentation better reflects the way
information about products is encountered in many purchase decisions,
both in terms of the sequential, brand-by-brand, nature of information
availability, and in terms of the structure of the information about
attributes and their values.
In order to assess the impact of awareness of choice strategy
knowledge on objective and perceived choice quality, the strategy
knowledge manipulation was also changed. One-half of the subjects (in
the strategy knowledge condition) were trained in the use of a choice
strategy that they were told would result in the selection of the best
overall brand, if used correctly. Thus, it was expected that they would
be aware that they possessed a choice strategy. The remaining subjects
(in the no-strategy condition) were given no training.
Subjects in the strategy knowledge condition were taught to use a
simple compensatory choice strategy. The strategy consisted of the
following steps. First, subjects had to rank order the brands on each
attribute from 1 (the best) to 4 (the worst). Then, subjects were asked
to sum the ranks across the brands. The brand with the lowest total
score was the best brand. This strategy was selected because of its
intuitive appeal and simplicity (Coupey 1990); moreover, because the
strategy is compensatory, it is a reasonably optimal method for making a
choice. The test stimulus was constructed so that one brand was always
the clear winner under this strategy. In addition, it was ensured that
the brand rankings obtained with this strategy would be the same as
those obtained using the more complex weighted-adding strategy.
A time limit was also imposed on all subjects. The time limit was
introduced to reduce the possibility that subjects in the no-strategy
condition had sufficient time to construct a strategy during the test
phase. The time limit was determined in a pretest by obtaining an
average of the response times for subjects adept in the use of the
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summed ranks strategy. The average, two and one-half minutes, was used
as a cut-off time in all conditions. Subjects were not told that there
was any time constraint before they started on the experiment. When the
time ran out, subjects were asked to make a choice immediately and the
experiment was ended.
Results .
Objective Choice Quality (Hypothesis 1) . The performance pattern
largely mirrored that observed in Study 1; Novices performed worst
(mean=2.96), followed by Amateurs (mean =2.76), and then Theorists
(mean=1.56). Experts (mean=1.5) outperformed subjects in all the other
cells.
A two-way analysis of variance with strategy knowledge and product
familiarity as the factors revealed a significant effect for strategy
knowledge (F.. 96 . = 34.46; p<0.0001). Subjects who were taught the
strategy significantly outperformed those who were not taught the
strategy (mean choice ranks were 1.53 and 2.86 respectively). However,
no significant effect was obtained for product familiarity (F (1 96) =
0.34; p<0.56).
The interaction effect of strategy knowledge and product
familiarity was also not significant (F.. 96) = 0.08; p<0.76). However,
because differences between cells were hypothesized a priori, a contrast
test between the cell means of Amateurs and Theorists was performed.
The test showed that the difference in objective choice quality was
significant (t (96) = 3.71; p<0.003), thereby providing support for
hypothesis 1.
Perceived Choice Quality (Hypothesis 2) . A two-way analysis of variance
was performed to assess the effects of strategy and product familiarity
on self-assessment of performance. The effect of strategy knowledge was
significant (F
(1 96) = 3.99; p<0.04). Subjects with strategy knowledge
made better quality choices than subjects with no strategy knowledge
(means were 1.32 and 1.50 respectively).
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There was no significant effect of product familiarity (F(
1 96)
=
0.08; p<0.78), but the interaction effect of strategy and product
familiarity was marginally significant (F
(1 96)
= 3.14; p<0.08). The
pattern of means was roughly the reverse of that observed in study 1:
this time, Novices ranked their performance lowest (mean=1.6), followed
by Amateurs (mean=1.4). Contrary to the predictions, Theorists ranked
their performance more highly than Experts (means were 1.26 and 1.38
respectively) . However, a contrast test of the difference between
Amateurs and Theorists was not significant (F (1 jg. = 0.88; p<0.38).
Performance Estimation Error (Hypothesis 3) . The results were fairly
consistent with those obtained in Study 1 and provided support for
hypothesis 3. Novices and Amateurs, with means of 1.36 each, were most
overconfident about their performance. As predicted, Theorists (mean
=0.30) were less overconfident than Amateurs. Experts were the least
overconfident (mean=0.12).
The interaction effect of strategy knowledge and product
familiarity was not significant (F
(1 g1) = 0.52; p<0.47). The contrast
between the means for Amateurs and Theorists, however, was significant
(t {96) = 2.93; p<0.004).
A two-way analysis of variance revealed a significant effect of
strategy knowledge (F {1 96) = 20.38; p<0.0001). The mean for subjects
without strategy knowledge was 1.36, compared with 0.21 for subjects
with strategy knowledge. Subjects without strategy knowledge were
overconfident whereas those with strategy knowledge were less
overconfident. Product familiarity did not have a significant effect on
overconfidence (F
(1 96)
= 0.12; p<0.72).
Subjects' Satisfaction and Confidence Ratings The ratings on the
outcome-related subjective ratings on confidence with the choice did not
show any significant differences for strategy knowledge (F (1 96) = 1.88;
p<0.17), or for product familiarity (F (1 96) = 1.88; p<0.17). There was
a significant crossover interaction effect of strategy and product
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familiarity (F
(
. 96)
= 5.06; p<0.02). Theorists expressed the highest
confidence in the quality of their outcomes (mean=6 . 80) . The
differences among the subjects in the other three cells were very small
(Novices=5 .48; Amateurs=5 . 80; Experts=5 . 48) . Once again, however, a
contrast of the difference between Amateurs and Theorists was
significant (t (96) = 1.93; p<0.05). It must be noted that Theorists were
the most confident in this study, whereas in Study 1, they were the
least confident. This may be explained by the emphasis on awareness of
strategy knowledge in Study 2.
Analysis of the process-related ratings of satisfaction obtained
on nine-point rating scales provided results similar to those obtained
in Study 1. Despite the difference in confidence ratings between
Study 1 and Study 2, awareness of an appropriate strategy apparently did
little to increase procedural satisfaction; the effect of strategy was
not significant (F
(1 96 *
= 0.79, p<0.38). The means for those with
strategy knowledge and those without were 5.9 and 6.3 respectively.
There was also no significant difference in satisfaction ratings between
subjects in the familiarity and no-familiarity conditions (F
(
. 96 .
=
0.06; p<0.81). The interaction effect of strategy knowledge and product
familiarity was marginally significant (F (1 96) = 2.56; p<0.11).
These results are summarized in Figure 4.
Figure 4 about here
Discussion
.
As in the first study, strategy knowledge appears more beneficial
for making good choices than product familiarity. In both studies,
Theorists outperformed Amateurs.
Making subjects aware of an appropriate strategy rule for making a
choice has an effect on perceived performance, rather than on objective
performance. In the first study, subjects without an opportunity to
develop a strategy rated their performance more highly than those with
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an opportunity, in the second study the pattern reverses; subjects
trained in the use of a strategy use rated their performance more highly
than those not trained.
The results of the Performance Estimation Error index suggest that
one effect of strategy awareness is to make subjects better able to
judge their choice performance. Subjects without the strategy training,
and, presumably, without the heightened level of strategy awareness,
tended to be significantly less able to predict their performance and
tended to be more overconfident than their counterparts.
The results of the ratings of satisfaction suggest that as in the
first study, subjects in this study with strategy knowledge are less
satisfied than their counterparts. Given the boost in confidence
observed from Study 1 to Study 2, this finding is surprising. One
possible explanation is that although subjects knew and used the
strategy because they were told it was appropriate, they still felt that
there were better methods for making the choice. That subjects still
used the strategy, however, is interesting from an application-oriented
perspective, described in the following section.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
General summary
These studies reveal a broader view of consumer expertise than has
been previously recognized. In this paper, expertise has been
conceptualized as a multi-stage process in which consumers can have
varying levels of expertise. This contrasts with previous- approaches
where consumers have been classified as either experts or novices. In
order to clarify the nature of consumer knowledge in these stages, two
knowledge components were described and examined.
Product familiarity was defined as knowledge specific to the
product category in which a choice is being made. This includes
knowledge about attributes relevant for making a choice, and the usual
ranges and most typical values of these attributes. Product familiarity
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is task-specific knowledge that is relevant only to choices being made
in a specific product category.
Strategy knowledge was defined as task-general knowledge. This
type of knowledge essentially consists of general choice rules that
consumers can apply to a particular choice situation. An example of
strategy knowledge is knowledge of a rule such as a weighted adding
rule. Strategy knowledge can be applied to choice in any product
category.
The two knowledge components were used to classify subjects into
four cells. A consumer with no product familiarity and no strategy
knowledge was classified as a Novice, one with product familiarity but
no strategy knowledge was classified as an Amateur, one with strategy
knowledge, but no product familiarity was classified as a Theorist, and
a consumer with both product familiarity and strategy knowledge was
classified as an Expert.
Two studies were conducted to assess the validity of this
conceptualization. The two studies compared objective and perceived
choice quality across the four groups above during a choice task. The
findings were generally consistent with the hypotheses. Strategy
knowledge led to superior objective choice quality whereas product
familiarity led to superior perceived choice quality. Interestingly,
Novices, who tended to objectively perform the worst, also tended to
perceive their performance as being the best. It appears that one
aspect of expertise is the development of a more realistic assessment of
one's performance. This was demonstrated by the performance estimation
error index.
The analysis of the performance estimation error index, obtained
by subtracting subjective performance from objective performance, showed
that, in both studies, Amateurs tended to be more overconfident than
Theorists. A possible explanation for this finding may lie in the
accessibility of the knowledge component. Product familiarity may be
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more accessible than strategy knowledge, which is more deeply encoded.
Some support for this finding was also obtained from confidence scale
ratings. The confidence ratings flipped in the two studies. Subjects
with strategy knowledge were more confident than those without in Study
2, whereas the result was reversed in Study 1. A main difference
between the two studies was that, in Study 2, subjects were explicitly
taught a rule and were made aware of their possession of the rule. This
suggests that awareness of rule knowledge may have a positive impact on
confidence in the choice outcome.
Limitations
In interpreting the results of these studies, the following
limitations must be noted. The experiments forced subjects into four
cells. This, while an advance over past studies, is still a somewhat
simplified representation of how expertise most likely develops in
reality. In reality, expertise is likely to be a continuum, rather than
a multi-stage process. However, in our opinion, this limitation of
simplifying reality is more than offset by the gain in experimental
manageability obtained by classifying consumers into four cells. It
must be noted that this artificial framework is more a convenience for
research purposes than a veridical depiction of consumer knowledge
acquisition.
Another limitation stems from the experimental nature of the
study. The manipulation of strategy knowledge was achieved in Study 1
by exposing subjects to five choice situations and in Study 2 by
teaching subjects a choice strategy. In reality, consumers probably
abstract strategies by a combination of the two methods, i.e., by making
repetitive choices and learning choice strategies from others.
Moreover, consumers in real life probably have a repertoire of choice
strategies with a mega-strategy, sensitive to situational constraints
(e.g. time pressure), that tells them when to use which choice strategy.
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CONCLUSIONS
Despite the limitations inherent in almost any experimental
evaluation of consumer behavior, several valuable conclusions may be
drawn from this research. First, consumer expertise is more than an
all-or-none proposition. By recognizing that there are intermediate
stages of expertise, marketers can tailor their communication of product
offerings to consumers in each of the four stages described in this
research.
An important application of this research is in the area of market
segmentation. The basic principle behind market segmentation has been
the notion that consumers can be classified into different segments on
the basis of their demand schedules (Smith 1956), and that managers can
increase their overall market performance by targeting different
strategies to different segments. This approach has essentially
concerned itself with identifying differences in consumer responses
across different segments. Less attention has been paid to
understanding why differences between segments may exist.
The current study makes an important contribution to explaining
why differences between consumers may exist. Essentially, we argue that
consumer responses may differ depending on the stage of expertise to
which consumers belong. Consumers who are knowledgeable about choice
strategies might be best influenced by detailed information about brand
attributes, whereas consumers who do not have knowledge of choice
strategies might best be influenced by being provided evaluative
criteria. Thus, in addition to creating distinct segments, using
knowledge components as a basis of segmentation also provides reasons
for differences in consumer responses across segments.
In addition, the finding that Theorists and Experts do not tend to
overestimate their performance (and may even underestimate it) indicates
that marketers can promote higher levels of product satisfaction by
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making consumers in the Theorists and Experts segments aware of their
choice making abilities.
There are also implications of this research for public policy
makers. For example, consider the finding that objective and perceived
performance are inversely related unless consumers are aware of their
knowledge. The potential for unsatisfactory consumption experiences can
be reduced by making consumers in the Novice and Amateur segments aware
that they are likely to overestimate the quality of their choices.
Educating consumers about the components of good decision-making, and
how to recognize the possession of those components, may eliminate many
negative product experiences.
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STUDY 1: SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION
NOVICES AMATEURS THEORISTS EXPERTS
TRAINING
PHASE
Product
Category
Microwave
ovens
Laptop
computers
Microwave
ovens
Laptop
computers
Task Judge
similarity
of brand
pairs
Judge
similarity
of brand
pairs
Choose the
best brand
Choose the
best brand
TEST
PHASE
Product
Category
Laptop
computers
Laptop
computers
Laptop
computers
Laptop
computers
Task Choose the
best brand
Choose the
best brand
Choose the
best brand
Choose the
best brand
Figure 2
STUDY ONE RESULTS
STRATEGY
KNOWLEDGE
PRODUCT FAMILIARITY
No Yes
NOVICES 1 2 AMATEURS
No N=12 N=16
OBJECTIVE: 2.42 OBJECTIVE: 2.31
PERCEIVED: 1.25 PERCEIVED: 1.56
OBJ-PERC: 1.27 OBJ-PERC: 0.75
THEORISTS 3 4 EXPERTS
Yes N=10 N=13
OBJECTIVE: 1.70 OBJECTIVE: 1.69
PERCEIVED: 1.60 PERCEIVED: 2.00
OBJ-PERC: 0.10 OBJ-PERC: -0.31
Figure 3
STUDY TWO RESULTS
No
STRATEGY
KNOWLEDGE
Yes
PRODUCT FAMILIARITY
No Yes
NOVICES 1 2 AMATEURS
N=25 N=25
OBJECTIVE: 2.96 OBJECTIVE: 2.76
PERCEIVED: 1.60 PERCEIVED: 1.40
OBJ-PERC: 1.36 OBJ-PERC: 1.36
THEORISTS 3 4 EXPERTS
N=23 N=24
OBJECTIVE: 1.56 OBJECTIVE: 1.50
PERCEIVED: 1.26 PERCEIVED: 1.38
OBJ-PERC: 0.30 OBJ-PERC: 0.12
Figure 4
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